article, however, addresses the other side of the coin: the transition from governing back to campaigning. We argue that this transition has become more difficult in the last two decades because of the change from a party-dominated to a candidate-centered presidential selection process. The electoral reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s have encouraged incumbent presidents to build their own personal White House staff-centered reelection campaign organizations rather than rely on the traditional party structure for tactical and logistical support.5 The result is that today, as Charlie Black, a Bush campaign operative, notes: "When you're an incumbent running for reelection, over half of the execution is at the White House, it's not in the campaign. The candidate's body, the schedule, the press, all of that, the message, the speechwriting, all of that is in the White House. "6 But White House dominance of reelection campaigns creates an organizational dilemma-one that pre-reform presidents did not confront. Because campaigning requires different skills and resources than governing, the postreform incumbents seeking a second presidential term must restructure their presidential staff. In contrast, their prereform presidential predecessors largely avoided this disruption, since they could rely on the party organization to perform many of the campaign's myriad tasks.
Using primary and secondary documents, supplemented by interviews with former presidential advisers and campaign officials, our argument proceeds in four stages. The first looks more closely at the organizational difficulties President Bush confronted during the 1992 election season. Part two provides an historical overview of reelection campaigns from Truman through Reagan, demonstrating the differences between the pre-and postreform reelection campaigns. Part three uses these observations to build a conceptual framework explaining why presidents find the transition from governing to campaigning more difficult since the electoral reforms of the 1960s and 1970s. In the concluding section, we discuss the organizational implications of these findings for incumbents seeking reelection.
THE BUSH PRESIDENTIAL STAFF, 1992
Interviews and secondary sources help paint a thorough portrait of the organizational disruption inflicted on the Bush White House by the 1992 campaign. The key message seems to be that Bush failed to transform a White House organized I By "traditional party structure," we mean state and local party chapters working in conjunction with the Democratic and Republican national party committees. By presidential "staff' we refer to those individuals formally linked to the president through hierarchical reporting relationships and whose primary incentives (pay, title, tenure, and jurisdiction) are subject to direct presidential influence. Three staff elements in particular will concern us here: the White House Office; members of the presidential cabinet composed of the heads of the major executive branch departments; and the senior members of the president's campaign organization. 6 Charles T. Royer, ed., Campaign To secure electoral support then, presidents bargain with delegates, interest groups, the general public, and others who can provide campaign resources. Typically, these bargains center on policy and personnel issues as reflected in party platforms and campaign promises, and political appointments such as the choice of a running mate and cabinet members. In return, presidents secure money, labor, delegates, and, ultimately, votes -the political capital by which (re)election is secured.
In contrast, campaign staff do not provide tangible reelection goods. Instead, they offer bargaining expertise -specialized knowledge that can help the president predict the likely impact of his bargaining choices on his campaign objectives.70 Analytically, staff-derived expertise can be distinguished from bargaining capital: the former helps presidents absorb the costs involved with negotiating bargaining details; the latter is a measure of a president's political strength.7' Prior to the campaign finance and delegate selection reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s, campaign expertise was largely the province of the traditional party structure -the loose federation of party leaders at the national, state, and local levels. The national party organization charted campaign strategy, solicited donations, and coordinated the overall reelection effort in response to presidential direction.72 Party officials at the state level provided the personnel and organiza-ORGANIZING THE PRESIDENCY | 63 tional expertise -controlling blocs of delegates and helping to mobilize voters in the general election.73 To be sure, party officials did not dictate campaign strategy to the president; the critical decisions were made by him in close consultation with his personal advisers.74 But presidents relied on party members to provide the information on which those decisions were based and to see that campaign strategy was carried out.
With the transformation of political parties as a result of campaign reforms, and a loosening of constraints on presidential staff size, however, successive presidents sought to replace the party with the president's own separate campaign organization and to control it directly from the White House. In effect, rather than rely on the existing party infrastructure, presidents began to internalize electoral expertise within their personal White House-centered campaign organizations.
The This potential, however, was not fully realized until changes to the presidential selection process undercut the parties' traditional role. The story is a familiar one. It is enough here to cite the major developments: campaign finance reform eroded the parties' financial ties to the candidate;77 delegate selection shifted from closed caucuses controlled by the old-style political machine to primaries open to the party rank-and-file;78 the media, prompted in part by the telecommunications revolution and changing standards of coverage, supplanted the party as the mediator between candidates and the public;79 and a changing issue pool loosened traditional party allegiances among voters, in part by mobilizing heretofore dormant political groups.80 Collectively, these developments transformed the electoral process from a party-centered to a candidate-centered system.8'
The cumulative impact on the parties' organized campaign role has been dramatic. Comparatively speaking, they are now more unified at the national level, with fundraising and spending control increasingly centralized within the national committees. But party influence over the presidential nominating process, particularly candidate selection, and the running of presidential campaigns, has declined.82 In the parties' stead, the White House staff has assumed campaign dominance, its members taking major responsibility for providing expertise pertaining to voter mobilization, campaign strategy, spending, policy, and media relations.
This switch in the locus of campaign control has produced unintended, and perhaps undesirable consequences from the incumbent president's perspective. Where once sitting presidents could expect the party to provide the necessary campaign expertise, now they must recruit and organize their own experts. Such a shift necessitates significant structural and personnel changes in the presidential staff.
We do not argue that governing and campaigning, and the resources required for both are mutually exclusive. Clearly, there is some overlap between the two. However, as Bradley Patterson, former assistant secretary to the Eisenhower cabinet, notes, the two missions are distinct enough to make it difficult for one organization to perform both effectively: "The virtues needed in the crucible of a campaign -are almost the opposite of the preparation needed for life within the White House." 83 More specifically, we argue, to govern effectively in the American political system, one must build coalitions. This means bridging differences between actors and institutions through negotiated compromises.84 Coalition building,
